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This IDS Bulletin, and the ‘Gender Myths and
Feminist Fables’ workshop on which it draws,
reflects on a sense of unease among feminists in
development work – a sense that gender
mainstreaming has produced disappointing results,
that we are as far as ever from influencing the flow
of funds and the shaping of policy in development
and that the burning debates in development and
international politics are occurring elsewhere. By
subjecting to critical scrutiny the myths that have
helped to win a feminist case in development, but
that have simplified and essentialised the feminist
project, we are engaging in uncomfortable self-
scrutiny that forces us to come to terms with two
key problems: the de-politicisation that
institutionalisation often breeds and the challenge
of remaining relevant to the larger development
agenda.
It is inevitable that gender mainstreaming has
produced outcomes different to that which feminists
might have hoped for – sometimes disappointing,
sometimes surprising. The translation of a radical
idea about social change into bureaucratic targets
and procedures unavoidably results in something
less world-shattering than the original revolutionary
intention. Bureaucracies, whether of a bilateral
development agency, a multilateral economic
institution, a developing state or a non-
governmental organisation (NGO), impose a
discipline of classification, ordering and above all,
containment, that has tended to strip the gender
and development project of its ambition to eliminate
gendered power disparities, and instead to focus
upon achievable practical projects – microfinance
instead of employment and property rights, for
instance.
But it would be churlish to dismiss or denigrate
the achievements of women and men who have
pursued the gender mainstreaming project inside
development bureaucracies. These bureaucracies
are often deeply resistant to gender-equity concerns,
and the women-targeted or gender-sensitive
programmes that they may produce are the result
of often intense internal struggle by committed staff
members. “Femocrats” risk undermining career
advance by pressing what is often still seen as a
counter-cultural and unpopular agenda. On the
contrary, incentives in bureaucracies encourage
conformity. Currently in the development field,
this means conformity with the neo-liberal
Washington consensus that sees the market as the
primary engine of growth and resource allocation.
In this environment, we must register as a significant
success that gender equity and women’s
empowerment has a place in most development
policy discussions and on the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) wish-list. To have got
this far is the result of deep commitment.
Constructive criticism of gender mainstreaming
has its place, but we must not leave out solidarity
with gender equity advocates working “on the
inside”, and recognition of the constraints under
which they work.
If we, as feminists working in development, are
unhappy with gender mainstreaming, we need to
consider whether we can offer a credible alternative
to current market-based orthodoxies. This brings
me to the second problem raised above: the
challenge of remaining relevant to the larger
development agenda. The failure of the neo-liberal
Washington consensus to reduce poverty has
created an opening for new perspectives and
critiques of mainstream development approaches.
The new “good governance” agenda has appeared
to offer promising footholds for gender-equity
concerns, but there is also a risk that it will simply
reinforce market-based approaches, resurrecting
the state from dismemberment mainly in order to
refigure it to better support the free movement of
capital.
First-generation economic reforms in the 1980s
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controlling market activity, social protection and
welfare. Some of the “good governance” reforms of
today represent a second generation of economic
reforms. Reforms designed to build the autonomy
of central banking institutions, tax collection
authorities and the judiciary, aim mainly to make
contracts more secure, install capitalist property
relations and free markets from public intervention.
The developmental role of these institutions, and
the part they play in enhancing the citizenship
entitlements of poorer people, can, in these
conditions, become a secondary concern. This is
not to say that important alternatives are not
simultaneously being developed. Via the auspices
of the UN, holistic understandings of human
development have been elaborated, and new
constitutions in some countries, such as South
Africa, attempt to accommodate cultural diversity
and battle social exclusion. Recognition of the
importance of “governance” – and more specifically,
politics – to development offers an important
opportunity to critics of market-driven approaches
to insert concerns with redistribution and equity.
But there is no questioning the centrality of the
market in current policy prescriptions, whether in
service delivery, legal reform, or macroeconomic
planning.
The tremendous build-up of global social
movements in opposition to market globalisation
in recent years has exposed the hypocrisy of rich
countries in supporting the market in selective and
self-serving ways. Terrorism has exposed what is
perhaps the tip of an iceberg of resentment at the
exclusions and injustices of an increasingly unequal
world. My concern is that the epistemological tools
and heuristics of feminism in development are
indeed, as Ann Whitehead said at the workshop,
“puny” in the face of the challenges raised by this
changing international environment. What does
feminism in development have to say as a critique
of market-based development strategies and of the
governance agenda? What alternatives can it offer
in terms of development strategies and visions of
social change that can respond to the resentments
and injustices of so many people? Above all,
feminism is challenged by identity politics: can a
vision of gender-equity and feminist versions of
social change compete with the versions of social
justice and institutional survival arrangements
offered through “traditional”, ascriptive, faith-based,
or other identity-based institutions?
For me, what Maxine Molyneux (this IDS
Bulletin) calls the ‘darkening international political
climate’ has provoked questions about the relevance
of “gender” as an entry-point to social analysis, and
as the basis for my politics. The nauseating photos
of abuse of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib crystallise
this for me. As Barbara Ehrenreich observes, the
engagement of American servicewomen in the
sexual humiliation of Iraqi men bound together in
one set of images illustrates  ‘everything that Islamic
fundamentalists believe characterises Western
culture … imperial arrogance, sexual depravity …
and gender equality’ (2004). These images certainly
puts paid to any lazy or naïve versions of feminism
that one might hold – versions of feminism that
celebrate the standpoint of women because they
are oppressed by men, that seek to place women
in positions of power and influence so that they
may bring their different needs and interests to bear
on decision making. These images remind us of a
point long stressed by Gender and Development
(GAD) advocates – that the object is not to add
women to existing institutions, but to transform
them, for otherwise distorted institutions will distort
new participants. Efforts to ease women’s access to
politics, and currently popular assumptions that
women in public life may be less corrupt than men,
or more gifted at peace-building, must surely be
reconsidered in light of the Abu Ghraib
photographs.
But more fundamentally, credible feminist
alternatives to fundamentalisms – market
fundamentalisms or religious ones – require a moral
vision that goes beyond gender equality. This is
what feminists from the South have been saying for
decades. I am also suggesting that we should start
from a reaffirmation of liberalism – a larger struggle
for human equality and perfectibility that opposes
the subordination of any individual, groups, nations
or races to any other. It is the connection between
liberalism and capitalism, and democracy and the
market, that has to be challenged, and the current
good governance agenda deserves careful scrutiny
for the ways that it may seek instead to strengthen
that connection.
This raises two issues of relevance for my earlier
points about gender mainstreaming and good
governance debates. First, our objective when
mainstreaming must be infiltration, not assimilation.
We have too often, understandably, sought
assimilation – we need personal career advance,
security, recognition, and for this we buy into
institutional cultures and mind-sets and goals. The
project of infiltration is harder to sustain and involves
taking risks, or at least, makes us unpopular with
colleagues.
Second, we need to develop our critique of the
neo-liberal consensus from a perspective that
supports strengthening the capacity of the state to
defend equality projects. The state, as an institution
for directing social change and protecting rights,
has been under assault from all sides for the last 25
years. It is discredited as a wanton spendthrift by
the Washington establishment, and vilified as an
agent of oppression and social control by progressive
groups, including some feminists. Of course, many
of the states deserved the assault – many have been
unaccountable and cleptocratic, many have so
dampened economic activity as to exacerbate
poverty, some have taken their remit to construct
a national identity into the realm of genocide or
ethnic persecution. Yet, as some of the other
commentary articles in this IDS Bulletin note, the
state is the main credible site from which to launch
a long-term project of social justice. States still retain
the capacities to devise and implement progressive
laws – globalisation, informalisation and
privatisation notwithstanding. Global governance,
though still only vaguely conceived, is perhaps a
desirable alternative to strengthening the state, but
the American penchant for unilateralism means
that global governance is a truly long way away.
States are the main institutional arenas in which
meaningful debates about legitimate social
arrangements can be pursued and enforced.
The pursuit of both projects, feminist infiltration
of institutions, and state-strengthening in the
interests of social justice, must be grounded in
feminist organisation – including providing the
institutional basis for tackling domestic violence,
providing women’s studies courses, providing legal
aid, promoting a satisfying work-life balance in the
workplace, and so on. Molyneux, Sardenberg,
Mama and others make this point too in this IDS
Bulletin. Autonomous feminist association is what
gives us the moral energy (and sense of humour)
to carry on, it is the crucible in which ideas about
alternative futures are generated, and it must
become an institutional basis upon which to ground
some of these alternatives. Assimilation is what
happens when we have no home to return to, no
community from which to draw affirmation and
support. Infiltration is possible when we can keep
one foot outside of the institutions we are trying to
change.
Infiltration is perhaps most important to pursue
in some of the political institutions that have to date
remained outside of the frame of gender and
development work – in particular political parties.
Women and feminists have experienced profound
difficulty in altering policies and practices within
political parties, yet these are the institutions that,
once in power, direct state policy and determine
the effectiveness of states in providing the positive
functions mentioned above. For infiltration of
parties to be effective, the credibility of feminists
as representatives of legitimate social concerns has
to be strengthened.
This points to another priority concern: the
accountability of feminist organisations to their
constituents. Feminist organisations often tend to
assume a constituency, rather than institutionalise
it through a paid-up membership with voting rights
or other means of connecting constituents to leaders
and establishing accountability systems. The
accountability of feminist organisations to members
and to women in general is an increasingly
problematic issue in contexts where secular feminist
movements seem to be losing ground in contrast
with illiberal theocratic projects that seem to
entrench restrictive interpretations of women’s
economic, sexual, and political rights. We are back
to an enduring question: can we identify women’s
interests as a gender, interests on the basis of which
we can organise and mobilise? And if not, then what
are feminist organisations accountable for, and to
whom?
Without autonomous feminist activity there is
a possibility that all of the energy we have put into
gender and development may have been harnessed
for the wrong reasons and the wrong outcomes.
Have we invested so much in primary education
only to provide global capital, disembedded from
national controls, with a more globally uniform
labour force? Have we invested so much in
microfinance so that surplus female labour may
retreat to survival activities when forced out of work
during periodic collapses of export industries? Have
we pushed for women’s inclusion in politics in order
to pour a democratic smoke-screen over the fact
that real power has shifted away from parliaments
to capital markets? Of course not – all of these
achievements have expanded women’s choices and
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resources. But if we are to be sure that we are not
participating in grooming women to become more
amenable handmaidens to international capital, we
need to reinvigorate autonomous feminist spaces
and we need to think beyond gender equality.
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